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Abstract
The educated have figured prominently in protests and elections in several MENA countries. The
dominant explanation for this pattern centers on grievances and unfulfilled aspirations due to low
education returns in the MENA. However, the pattern may simply reflect the unequal participation
observed in many democracies where education provides skills and resources that facilitate political
participation. This article compares the roles of skills and grievances in explaining the relationship
between education and youth political participation during and after the Arab Spring. We use youth
surveys with detailed data on education and political participation from Egypt and Tunisia. We
control for parental education and family background to partially account for the potential of
background to drive the education and participation relationship. Overall, our results are consistent
with the skill channel and lend little support to the grievance channel. Our findings raise concerns
about the exclusion of uneducated youth from both unconventional and conventional political
participation in MENA politics.
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Introduction
Before the Arab Spring, elections in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were held in
hegemonic authoritarian regimes where turnout was driven by clientelistic linkages, coercion, or
appraisals of regime quality (De Miguel et al., 2015) Poverty and lack of education were strong
predictors of electoral participation (Pellicer and Wegner, 2014) With the Arab Spring this pattern of
political participation changed in some Middle Eastern countries, with educated citizens taking
center stage in protests and elections. Protest participants in the Arab Spring were more likely to be
among the more educated (Beissinger et al. 2012). Surveys of voters in the fairly free elections
following the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya showed that more educated, urban
voters were more likely to turn out than uneducated, rural ones (Benstead et al., 2013).i
Most democracies around the world display a positive relationship between education and
political participation (Gallego, 2014). The standard explanation for this relationship is that
education provides skills and resources that encourage political participation (Brady et al., 1995).
The positive relation between education and political participation observed in the MENA when
contexts were freer could thus reflect simply an evolution towards the familiar unequal participation
patterns around the world.
However, this has not been the standard account of the role of education for political
participation during and after the Arab Spring. The more frequently invoked narrative focuses on
youth grievances. Concerns about lack of access to formal stable jobs and the frustration and
discontent this engenders in youth are common around the world (UNDP, 2014). However, in the
MENA these concerns are particularly heightened (World Bank, 2014). In particular, returns to
education are particularly low for MENA youth (Krafft, 2018; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2009), and as a
result the educated youth in the MENA are thought to have particularly high levels of grievances.
The standard accounts of the Arab Spring depict the turnout of highly educated youth as stemming
from their high grievances, not from their mobilization advantage (Goldstone, 2011; Sanborn and
Thyne, 2014).

This article seeks to disentangle the skill and grievance channels for driving youth political
mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt during and immediately after the Arab Spring. These two
channels have very different consequences for the type of grievances that are articulated and heard
in the MENA. If the grievance channel is the main driver, the higher grievances of the educated
would be articulated and heard. If the skill channel is the main driver, the grievances of the
uneducated in the MENA may remain unarticulated.
Assessing the grievance and skill theories is not straightforward, for two reasons. First,
youth feature prominently both in accounts of recent political participation in the MENA, and in the
grievance explanation of this participation. A focus on youth requires information on a sufficiently
large number of youth, which is typically lacking in the representative opinion surveys commonly
used, such as the Arab Barometer or the World Values Survey. Second, education is correlated with
many other variables relevant for political participation, such as family background. Accounting for
this is important in order to isolate the role of education. Opinion surveys typically do not include
measures of family background and thus are not able to account for relevant confounders of
education.
This article assesses the grievance and skill theories by analyzing the effects of education on
youth grievances, skills, and political participation in Egypt and Tunisia. Our analysis partially
addresses the data and identification challenges just mentioned. We analyze two rich data sets
focusing on youth in Tunisia and Egypt: the 2014 Survey of Young People in Egypt with around
15,000 observations and the 2012 World Bank Tunisia Urban and Rural Youth Surveys with around
5,500 observations. While these surveys still suffer from some of the common problems that plague
surveys in the MENA as described in Pellicer and Wegner (2018) (notably regarding responses
under the fear of repression), they appear to be of fairly high quality. Moreover, the surveys contain
information on several siblings and on parental education, and this allows us to control for family
background.
We measure grievances using questions on life satisfaction, happiness, and trust in the state

(or satisfaction with the country, for the case of Egypt). In order to assess the skill theory, we focus
on questions regarding political knowledge. For participation, we consider participation in the 2011
uprising in Egypt, as well as voting in the first post Arab Spring elections in Tunisia and Egypt.
We find evidence consistent with the skills theory, with education being linked to higher
political knowledge, both subjectively and objectively. In contrast, there is no evidence supporting
the link between education and grievances. Youth with high educational attainment generally tend
to be happier, more satisfied with their lives, and more satisfied with the status of their country
compared to less educated youth. Although these effects tend to disappear once we control for
family background, this result puts into question the relevance of a substantial grievance channel.
We assess the extent to which the effect of education is mediated by skills or grievances and find
results along the same lines: part of the effect of education on political participation seems to be via
skills, but not via heightened grievances.
Our findings help clarify drivers of youth political participation in the MENA in a way that
challenges notions of ‘Arab exceptionalism.’ First, our findings clarify the role of education in
MENA protest behavior among youth. As noted above, many accounts of protest participation
emphasize particular grievances of educated youth in the Middle East, particularly those of
unemployed university graduates. Our analysis suggests that these particular grievances do not
account for the higher propensity to participate politically by the highly educated. This is not to say
that educated youth in the Middle East do not have legitimate grievances, or that these grievances
do not matter for their political participation. What our analysis questions is the idea that the highly
educated tend to participate politically more in the MENA because of their higher level of
grievances. Instead, it seems to be the skills associated with education that help the educated to
articulate their grievances politically. In this way, protest participation in the MENA might reflect
more general trends of youth political behavior in other contexts. Anti-austerity protests in
European countries, for example, have been dominated by highly educated, un- or underemployed
youth with little participation from the working class segments of society who were most strongly

hit by austerity (Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Hylmö and Wennerhag, 2016). Similar to their MENA
counterparts, these educated youth do not have grievances that are a priori higher than those of the
uneducated but have the skills to articulate them via protest.
Second, our findings contribute to understanding drivers of conventional political
participation in the MENA more generally. In standard MENA elections the poor and uneducated
have been most likely to turn out (Blaydes, 2010; Pellicer and Wegner, 2014). In contrast, our
analysis finds the skills channel of education to be an important driver of political engagement. This
suggests, that, in conditions of relative freedom, as was the case in 2011/2012, MENA political
participation follows a similar logic as participation in consolidated democracies.
In addition, our findings raise concerns about the exclusion of uneducated youth from both
unconventional and conventional political participation in MENA politics. That educated youth are
overall more likely to participate does not imply that the uneducated lack strong grievances. Indeed,
several scholars have highlighted the grievances and initial participation of the uneducated and
disenfranchised youth in the Arab uprisings (Merone, 2015; Shehata, 2012; Woltering, 2013). The
fact that educated youth came to be more dominant in MENA political participation and the
uneducated remained excluded raises question of how the grievances of the poor and uneducated
will be addressed and articulated. As the literature on political participation in Western democracies
points out, the political exclusion of the uneducated and minority groups is concerning (Gallego,
2014; Schlozman et al., 2018). Exclusion from political participation implies that the problems of
such groups are less relevant to policymakers and this may fuel further disadvantage and
grievances.

Framework: Grievances or skills?
We consider two channels that potentially link education to political participation in the Arab Spring
protests and post Arab spring elections. The channels are depicted in Figure 1. The first channel
corresponds to the ‘skills’ theory of political participation. The premise for this theory is the well-

established relationship between education and involvement in civic and political activities through
conventional participation such as voting as well as through unconventional participation such as
protest (Brady et al., 1995; Norris, 2002; Sondheimer and Green, 2010). Education is argued to
create skills that are useful for political participation: education may enable citizens to better grasp
political problems, to have higher beliefs about efficacy, and to become part of peer groups that
value political participation and transmit political knowledge. The skill theory has been used to
explain the Arab Spring in Campante and Chor (2012). Accounts of political participation in MENA
that emphasize the role of social media networks requiring literacy and computer skills also build –
albeit not always explicitly – on the skill theory (Breuer, 2016; Lynch, 2011).
The second channel corresponds to the ‘grievance theory’ of the origin of the Arab Spring. This
builds on the well-established finding in the protest literature that a relevant driver of protest is
deprivation relative to some reference point (Gurr, 1970). For educated youth in the MENA, this
reference is likely to be the job market outcomes of earlier cohorts of educated citizens. Earlier
cohorts were likely to be employed in stable public sector jobs or state-owned companies. However,
returns to education in the MENA have declined substantially (Krafft, 2018; Pellicer, 2018). Newly
educated cohorts now find it increasingly difficult to obtain valued public sector employment, and
unemployment and underemployment are particularly high among the educated youth (Dhillon et
al., 2009). Thus, education raised aspirations for current educated youth, but the labor market was
unable to fulfill them. These unfulfilled aspirations translated into the grievances motivating the
political participation of educated youth. The consequences of these grievances for political
participation in the MENA have been emphasized in Goldstone (2011) and Sanborn and Thyne
(2014).
We operationalize the two theories as implying that different variables mediate the effect of
education on political participation in the MENA. In other words, the two theories imply very
different reasons why youth with more education are more likely to participate politically than those
with less education. In the skill theory, this is because education provides youth with tools that

make it easier to mobilize; skills mediate the effect of education on political participation. In the
grievance theory, it is because education generates unfulfilled aspirations: grievances mediate the
effect of education on political participation. It is of course also possible that both theories are
correct and that both skills and grievances mediate the effect of education on political participation.
Figure 1: Channels linking education to political participation

The grievance theory implies that it is the combination of education and poor labor market
outcomes that generates most grievances and is most likely to lead to political participation (see
Figure 1). In contexts like the MENA, where labor market opportunities for graduates are severely
limited, this indeed implies a mediating role of grievances for the effect of education on political
participation: education heightens aspirations that, on average, are unfulfilled and lead to
grievances. However, it is also useful as a robustness check to consider a more literal interpretation
of the grievance theory in terms of the interaction between education and labor market success for
grievances and political participation. Then, the grievance theory can be operationalized as having
two implications. First, labor market success ought to reduce grievances and reduce political
participation among those with more education. Second, these effects should be stronger for those
with higher education. In other words, this operationalization of the grievance theory implies that
landing a bad job as opposed to a good one is painful and leads to political participation for the
highly educated, and the more so the higher one’s education.

Data and empirical approach
Data
We use the 2012 World Bank Tunisia Household Surveys on Youth in Urban and Rural
Areas (THSYUA and THSYRA) and the 2014 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE). The
THSYUA and THSYRA were actually administered separately and some items in the questionnaire
differ between the two. Except for one question on political knowledge, we choose variables present
in both surveys. Both surveys contain a household module with socioeconomic information and a
special youth module answered by individuals 15 to 29 years old with detailed questions on
attitudes. In the THSYUA 4,214 households and 3,936 youth were sampled, while in the THSYRA
1,400 households and 1,396 youth were sampled.ii The SYPE was first fielded in 2009, prior to
Egypt’s 2011 revolution. The 2009 round included 15,029 youth aged 10-29 (Population Council,
2011). The post-revolution second round was fielded in 2013/14 and successfully tracked 72% of

the 2009 sample, a total 10,916 youth (Roushdy and Sieverding, 2015).iii Sample weights, which
reflected the sampling strategy in 2009, were updated in 2014 to account for attrition. In both the
2009 and 2014 rounds, household data were collected, as well as information from individual youth.
In the youth questionnaires, there were detailed modules about educational experiences, political
participation, and opinions. In the 2013/14 round, there were specific questions relating to the
revolution.
Variables
We restrict our attention to concepts that can be captured by the surveys in the two settings
in a reasonably homogeneous way. Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides a full account of all
variables, including the original survey questions and their possible responses, as well as our coding
of the relevant variables. To capture the concept of grievances, we use life satisfaction, happiness
and trust/satisfaction with the state. We combine the three variables into an index (‘satisfaction
index’) that is simply the average of the three standardized items.
The questions on life satisfaction and attitudes towards the state in the Egyptian survey are

somewhat unusual. For the 2014 SYPE, these questions are part of a module on community values
and are asked explicitly in reference to the major political events in Egypt in recent years.
Specifically, the three questions ask about life satisfaction before the 25th January revolution, from
January 25th, 2011 to June 30th, 2013 (when former president Mohammed Morsi was ousted), and
since June 30th, 2013. Three further questions cover the same periods, but ask about satisfaction
with the state of the country instead of life satisfaction. Because these questions target such specific
political situations, we believe that they can be misleading as measures of general satisfaction. This
is particularly so given that we seek to test theories that deal with socioeconomic grievances, and
not exclusively political ones. We thus simply take as our measure for satisfaction the average of the
satisfaction variables in the three periods, whether it be referring to life satisfaction or satisfaction
with the country.
In contrast, in the Tunisian survey, questions about life satisfaction and attitudes towards the
state are more standard. The life satisfaction question simply asks the extent to which one is
satisfied with one’s life. The question on attitudes towards the state is part of a battery of questions
asking about trust in various institutions, one of which is the state.
For political knowledge, we use two indicators: one on self-reported knowledge of politics,
and another on ‘objective’ political knowledge. The latter asks a question of political knowledge
(voting age in Tunisia, and the name of the governor of the respondent’s governorate in Egypt) and
codes whether the answer is correct or not.
For political participation, we use questions on participation in protest events in Egypt as
well as voting in Tunisia and Egypt. Information on participation in the Egyptian January 25th
Revolution includes a series of questions. There are questions on participation in different types of
activities, such as participation in party meetings, or providing support for protesters. We create a
participation variable equal to one if the respondents participated in any of these activities (except
for participation in security-related night watches, which can be considered a non-political activity).
However, this variable is likely to suffer from a problem common in surveys conducted in

repressive contexts, where respondents are understandably reluctant to respond truthfully (Pellicer
and Wegner, 2018). We tackle this problem by considering less sensitive alternative questions
available in SYPE 2014 on whether family and friends participated in the revolution, and whether
the respondent supports the revolution. On voting, we use questions on the two elections resulting
from the Arab Spring protests. In Tunisia, voting for the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections; in
Egypt voting in the parliamentary election rounds of 2011/2012.
Our main explanatory variable is years of education, which ranges from 0 to 18. We restrict
our sample to those over 20 years old to reduce the share of the sample that has not yet completed
their education. In our samples, only around 13% of respondents in Tunisia and around 5% in Egypt
are still studying. For some of our empirical exercises, we need measures of labor market success.
In all surveys, we have information on monthly income. Our benchmark income variable essentially
captures income quartiles. In particular, this is an income category variable that has value zero if the
person earns no wage, and values 1 to 3 if her income belongs to the 1st to 3rd terciles, among those
with positive income. For robustness, we consider alternative measures of labor market success:
employment status, and log income (where those with no employment are dropped). We also
measure the degree of religiosity using questions on time spent on religious activities. In Tunisia,
religiosity is coded as 1 if the person spent time on religious activities last week and 2 if person
spent one hour or more in the previous day. In Egypt, religiosity is coded as the average of the
frequencies (always, most of the time, sometimes etc.) of practicing different religious activities
(praying, fasting during Ramadan, etc.).
Descriptive statistics
Table A2 in the Online Appendix provides the summary statistics of our samples. The results
appear sensible, picking up well-known differences between Egypt and Tunisia, such as the slightly
greater youth educational attainment in Tunisia (Krafft and Alawode, 2018) or later ages at marriage
and more nuclear households (Assaad et al., 2016; Salem, 2015), leading to a higher incidence of
being the son or daughter of the household head in Tunisia. Regarding the outcome questions, it is

important to note that they are not strictly comparable across countries, for the exact question asked
in each country differs. Another important point to note is the high number of missing values in the
parental education variables of the Tunisian sample. This reflects, partly, the fact that in this survey
parental education is not available when parents do not live in the same household as their children.
The table shows the descriptive statistics of political participation variables. Consistent with
the argument above, there is a strong discrepancy between respondents in Egypt in 2014 reporting
that they have actively participated in the revolution and those that say that their close friends and
family did. For voting, participation is very similar in Egypt and Tunisia (a turnout of around 5658% of the sample). For comparison, we also provide information on voting pre-revolution, from
the 2009 survey (for respondents aged 21-29 in 2009). The turnout figure is a much lower: 19%.
This strengthens the idea that the pattern of voting changed after the Arab Spring.
Because the theories we seek to address in this article emphasize the labor market outcomes
of different education groups, we also present some descriptive statistics on labor market outcomes.
Table A3 in the Online Appendix shows the distribution of income categories by education level
(less than secondary, secondary and university), for those not studying, and separately for men and
women. Two things are worth noting from this table. First, most young women are in the zero
income category, with zero earnings, in all samples. Second, young men with high education tend to
have more density in the highest, but also the lowest, income category relative to other education
levels, likely because they are not employed. Overall, consistent with the literature, the table shows
fairly meager returns to education in our samples, particularly in Egypt.
Empirical approach
The theories we seek to assess can be interpreted as stating that grievances or skills/political
knowledge mediate the relation between education and political participation, or, in other words,
that education affects political participation through a grievances or a skills/knowledge pathway.
We assess this in two ways. First, we simply check if education is positively related to
political participation, political knowledge and indicators of grievances. This is a partial but

transparent way of testing these mediation hypotheses: if grievances (skills) mediate the effect of
education on political participation, we ought to observe a positive relation between education and
grievances (skills), and a positive relation between education and political participation. Failure to
observe any of these relationships puts these hypotheses seriously in question.
To implement this, we simply estimate OLS regressions of measures of political
participation, grievances, and skills on education. Our estimates have standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity. In the basic specification, we control for sex, a full set of age dummies,
governorate dummies, birth order dummies and a rural/urban indicator. We also consider
specifications that control for family background, using two approaches: first, we control for
parental education and, second, we restrict the sample to households with more than one child over
20 with different years of education and perform a regression with family fixed effects on this

sample.iv Our preferred specification is the one with parental education controls. This is because the
family fixed effect specification tends to lead to highly imprecise estimates, due to its relatively low
sample size and the low variability of education that results from exploiting only within-family
variation.
Second, we perform a formal mediation analysis using the procedure in Imai et al. (2011).
They separate the total effect of education on our political participation outcomes in two parts, the
part mediated by skills (or grievances), and the rest, which is then considered the ‘direct effect.’ The
mediated part is computed by estimating separately a model for the mediating variable and another
model for the outcome that includes the mediator. The mediated effect is computed by predicting
the outcome for different values of the mediator. Lastly, we implement the alternative
operationalization of the grievance theory mentioned above by using an interaction between
education and income. We regress satisfaction variables and political participation variables on
education, on a variable measuring income, on the interaction of the two, and on the controls above
including parental education.

Results: Education, grievances, skills, and political participation
Basic results
Table 1 shows the basic regression results. Each row corresponds to a different outcome
variable. The table displays only the coefficients for years of education. All regressions control for
the basic characteristics mentioned above, such as age, gender, etc.
Columns 1 (for Tunisia), and 4 (for Egypt) show results without controlling for family
background. The first four rows (outcomes) are for political participation. The two theories both
imply that education should be positively related to political participation. The table shows that
more educated individuals are indeed more likely to be politically active. Education is positively
related to voting in Egypt and in Tunisia. Moreover, for Egypt, education appears clearly correlated
with participation in the revolution, according to all indicators.
The next four rows of the table address the grievance channel. According to the grievance
theory, education ought to be linked with less happiness, lower life satisfaction and more negative
attitudes towards the country. This is not, however, what we observe. Results generally seem to go
in the opposite direction than hypothesized, with more educated individuals displaying fewer
grievances. The only exception is satisfaction with (trust in) the state, where the coefficient for
education is, although positive, statistically insignificant.v
Results on the ‘skill’ theory are much more clear-cut and robust. Individuals with more
education consistently appear to display higher levels of political knowledge, and this applies both
to self-reported levels of knowledge as well as objective knowledge. This holds true for both Egypt
and Tunisia.
Potential bias from family background
The previous correlations could be driven by family background, if children of higher
socioeconomic status parents obtain more education, display higher political involvement and
political knowledge, and report higher life satisfaction than those with lower socio-economic status
parents. In this section, we address this issue by controlling for family background, first by

controlling for parental education and then by including family fixed effects.
Columns 2 and 3 (for Tunisia), and columns 5 and 6 (for Egypt) in show the results. Adding
parental controls has generally little effect on the coefficients. The introduction of family fixed
effects has more impact, with some coefficients becoming small and loosing statistical significance.
Results for political participation remain fairly strong even accounting for family background. For
voting, coefficients remain virtually unchanged; for participation in the revolution, significance
levels are eventually lost, but this is mainly because of increasing standard errors. For political
knowledge coefficients also tend to remain large and statistically significant. The main impact of
family background is seen in grievance indicators, where coefficients become small and statistically
insignificant once we control for family characteristics.
Overall, our results suggest a positive effect of education on political participation and on
political knowledge over and above the potential confounder of family background. The general
conclusion on grievances also remains unchanged: it appears that education does not lead to less
satisfaction even when family background is taken into account. Of course, we still cannot interpret
our results causally. It could well be that other biases induced by personal attributes such as ability,
ambition or motivation underlie the associations we observe. Nevertheless, we believe our analysis
is an important step forward in that it rules out one of the most important potential confounders.
Non-linear effect of education on grievances
The above results suggest that there is no clear monotonic relation between education and
grievances. A relation could still exist, however, and not be monotonic. In particular, it may be that
those with the most education have not been the ones suffering the most from the retrenchment of
public sector jobs and are thus not the ones holding the strongest grievances. There are reasons to
believe that, at least for the case of Egypt, those with the highest grievances could be secondary
school graduates (most of whom would have pursued the vocational track). This education group
appears to have lost the most, as they formerly had guaranteed access to public sector jobs but no
longer do (Assaad, 1997; Assaad and Krafft, 2014). This is also the group for whom returns to

education have dropped the most and are currently close to zero (Krafft, 2018). The situation is less
clear for Tunisia, where public sector employment guarantees did not exist.
In order to address this potential non-linearity, we re-examine the grievance-related
outcomes using as the explanatory variable a more refined measure of education, which breaks
down schooling into primary or no formal education (the reference category), preparatory (lower
secondary school, which never had public sector job guarantee), vocational secondary, general
secondary, and university. We run the same analyses as before, with parental education controls, for
both Egypt and Tunisia even if for Tunisia no specific pattern is anticipated.
The results are shown in Table A4 in the Online Appendix. Again, the table does not display
a very clear pattern. In particular, the coefficients for vocational secondary are generally positive,
contrary to the idea that this group holds the highest grievances. The only exception is trust in the
state in Tunisia, where the individuals the least education tend to have the highest levels.
All in all, it does not appear that the absence of a correlation between education and
grievances comes from ignoring the potentially non-linear nature of the relationship. Of course, this
does not mean that more educated individuals, or those specifically with vocational secondary
education are not the ones that have lost the most in terms of public sector employment
opportunities. However, this does not appear to translate directly into satisfaction or attitudes
towards the state, and this again puts into question the relevance of the grievance hypothesis for
political mobilization.
Mediation analysis
The above results show that education correlates with political knowledge but not with
grievances, but this does not address the extent to which these variables mediate the effect of
education on political participation. To assess this, shows the results of the mediation analysis. The
table includes analyses for four outcome variables: voting in Tunisia, and voting, participation in the
revolution, and support for the revolution in Egypt. For each outcome, the table shows the
proportion of the total effect of education on the outcome that is mediated by either knowledge or

grievances. The p-value associated to the hypothesis that the mediated proportion is zero is also
given.vi
The main insight from the table is that grievances do not appear to mediate the effect of
education on political participation for any of the variables. The estimated mediated proportions are
always very small. In contrast, the proportion mediated by knowledge variables is significant
statistically and substantively. This is consistent with the results above, suggesting that part of the
effect of education on political participation occurs via political knowledge but not via grievances.
The mediation analysis shows that knowledge accounts for a modest proportion of the total effect
for voting and for support for the revolution (around 11–14%), but for a large share of the total
effect of education on participating in the revolution (around 62%).
Grievances as a result of interactions between education and income
We consider here the alternative operationalization of the grievance theory focusing on
interactions between education and income. As mentioned above, the grievance delivers
implications for the effect of income for those with high education, and for the interaction between
income and education. To address the effect of income for the highly educated in the presence of
interaction terms, we center the education variable at 15 years of education. The grievance theory
then implies: (1) A positive (negative) coefficient on income for satisfaction (political participation)
outcomes, and (2) A positive (negative) interaction term between income and education for
satisfaction (political participation) outcomes. We undertake the analysis separately for the whole
sample as well as for men alone because the low labor force participation rate of women implies
that income may not be an accurate indicator of success/ failure and frustration for this group.
Table A5 in the Online Appendix shows the results using satisfaction variables as outcomes.
For each of the two countries, the first column shows results for the whole sample, and the second
column only for men. The coefficient for the income variable in the table shows that income is
positively related to satisfaction among those with high education. This is consistent with the
grievance hypothesis. However, the interaction term between education and income tends to be

negative rather than positive (particularly in the male subsamples), although it is mostly statistically
insignificant. This is at odds with the grievance theories. It implies that the satisfaction from
obtaining a good job, and thus the pain of obtaining a bad one is weaker, instead of stronger, for
those with high education.
Next, we consider the interaction of income and education for explaining political
participation. Results of this exercise are in Table A6 in the Online Appendix. The grievance theory
would imply a negative coefficient for the income variable as well as a negative interaction effect.
The results in table show instead rather small coefficients, generally statistically insignificant, and
as likely to be positive as to be negative. A notable exception is the case of self-reported
participation in the revolution in Egypt. For this outcome, the direction of the effects is in line with
the expectations from the grievance hypothesis: Bad labor market outcomes are associated with a
higher likelihood of participating in the revolution for those with high education (although the
coefficient is not statistically significant), and this difference is larger than for those with low
education. However, even in this case, results are not robust to other proxies of participation in the
revolution. As mentioned above, a surprisingly small share of respondents admit to having
participated in the revolution and for this reason it is important to check results also for questions
considering participation of friends and support of the revolution. Coefficients when considering
these alternative measures turn out to be positive (although again small and statistically
insignificant).
Tables A7 and A8 in the Online Appendix report results from similar analyses using other
measures of labor market success, employment and log income. The same broad patterns apply
using these alternative measures, although coefficients using log income tend to be smaller and
almost always statistically insignificant.
The role of religiosity
Our results up to here have been conducted for the whole youth population. However, the
role of education for political participation could be markedly different for certain subgroups within

the youth population. Here, we focus on a particularly prominent social and political cleavage in the
MENA: religiosity (Wegner and Cavatorta, 2018). It is possible that education plays a different role
for political participation among highly religious youth than among less religious youth.
We investigate this possibility by interacting education with religiosity in our regressions.
This estimates the direct role of religiosity for grievances, knowledge, and political participation, as
well as whether the effect of education on these variables differs between highly religious and less
religious youth. Table A9 in the Online Appendix shows the results. The religiosity variable has
been standardized (i.e. demeaned and divided by its standard deviation) for ease of interpretation.
The table shows that religiosity generally has a positive effect on satisfaction, on political
knowledge and on political participation, both in Tunisia and in Egypt. Religiosity appears
negatively correlated with participation in the revolution. This result is counterintuitive, since the
revolution brought to power an Islamist party. The reason for this is probably the measurement
problems mentioned above, whereby respondents might have feared admitting they participated in
(or even supported) the revolution. Supporting this view, we observe that religiosity is positively
correlated with having friends that participated in the revolution. On the question of whether
education matters differently for youth highly religious relative to youth less religious, results are
less strong. Generally, the interaction between education and religiosity is small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero: Religiosity does not affect the role of education on political knowledge
or political participation. The only exception is grievances in Egypt, where the interaction term is
negative. From the size of the coefficients, it can be inferred that education is associated with more
satisfaction for people with low religiosity. However, for highly religious Egyptian youth, education
may have a small negative effect on satisfaction. This suggest that the grievance narrative may be
have been relevant for explaining the political behavior of highly religious youth in Egypt.

Concluding remarks
In this analysis, we investigated two alternative theories linking education to youth political

participation in the Middle East and North Africa, the ‘skill theory’ and the ‘grievance theory’. Does
education encourage political participation by providing skills, or by generating unfulfilled
aspirations that lead to grievances? Overall, our results point toward the skill rather than the
grievance theory. We find that education is linked to both objective and subjective political
knowledge, even controlling for parental education controls or family fixed effects. In contrast, we
find little support for the grievance theory. We do not find a positive correlation between education
and different measures of grievances, suggesting that grievances do not mediate the effect of
education on political participation. Moreover, we also do not find much support for the
implications of the grievance hypothesis regarding the interaction between education and income. If
at all, satisfaction of individuals with less education tends to be more, rather than less, sensitive to
income than that of individuals with more education; and income does not seem to depress voting
behavior. The only (albeit important) instance where results are consistent with the grievance
hypothesis is when it comes to self-reported participation in the revolution. Even then, these results
no longer hold when using other proxies for participation in the revolution (such as support for the
revolution or participation of family and friends). We also find some indication that the grievance
theory may be more relevant for some subgroups among youth than others; notably we find that for
youth of high religiosity in Egypt education is (weakly) associated with less satisfaction.
Our finding that education does not increase grievances does not mean that low and
decreasing economic returns to education in the Arab World should be ignored. What our results
suggest is rather that the grievances of MENA youth with little education may require special
attention: These grievances appear to be greater than commonly assumed and may easily remain
unheard.
Our findings have potentially important implications for patterns of political participation
and inequality in the MENA. If uneducated youth are less likely to participate in politics either by
standard conventional (voting) or unconventional (protesting) means, different avenues are possible
for them. One is further disengagement from politics and alienation from the democratic process,

and accordingly lower support for democratic institutions. Another, complementary, avenue is that
the uneducated youth might engage in more radicalized political organizations. For example,
Merone (2015) suggests that one possible path for disenfranchised youth to address their political
exclusion in Tunisia is engagement with Salafist movements.
The fact that the grievances of the uneducated may remain unheard by policymakers has
potentially strong implications for inequality in the region. In fact, a recent paper on inequality in
the MENA terms the MENA the ‘world’s most unequal region’ (Alvaredo, et al. 2017). This is
partly due to large income differences between the countries of the region, but also to very large
within-country disparities. There is therefore the risk of a vicious circle of high inequality, political
alienation of disadvantaged citizens that leaves their grievances unaddressed, and thus further
inequality and political alienation.
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Tables

Table 1: OLS regression models for various outcomes: Coefficient on education, by inclusion of family background controls

Participation
Vote

{1}

Tunisia 2012
{2}

{4}

Egypt 2014
{5}

{3}

{6}

0.0189***
(0.0019)

0.0167***
(0.0028)

0.0189***
(0.006)

0.0237***
(0.0015)
0.0021***
(0.0005)
0.0027**
(0.0012)
0.0073***
(0.0014)

0.0218***
(0.0017)
0.0014***
(0.0005)
0.0019
(0.0013)
0.0066***
(0.0015)

0.0253***
(0.0045)
0.0012
(0.0014)
-0.0008
(0.0031)
0.004
(0.0035)

0.0288***
(0.0042)
0.0228***
(0.0035)
0.0058
(0.0038)
0.0204***
(0.0028)

0.0326***
(0.006)
0.0202***
(0.005)
0.0087
(0.0053)
0.0216***
(0.0039)

-0.0028
(0.0118)
-0.0049
(0.0097)
0.0316***
(0.012)
0.0056
(0.0083)

0.013***
(0.0044)
0.0027***
(0.001)
0.0059
(0.0047)
0.0072***
(0.0022)

0.0116**
(0.0049)
0.0028***
(0.0011)
0.0043
(0.0053)
0.0067***
(0.0024)

-0.0056
(0.0102)
0.0053*
(0.0029)
0.0005
(0.0113)
0.0048
(0.0057)

0.049***
(0.0027)
0.0112***
(0.0024)
1775
no
no

0.0507***
(0.0039)
0.0114***
(0.0035)
1118
yes
no

0.0341***
(0.0103)
0.0111*
(0.0064)
636
no
yes

0.0496***
(0.0032)
0.0095***
(0.0008)
4813
no
no

0.0453***
(0.0035)
0.008***
(0.0009)
4807
yes
no

0.0399***
(0.0083)
0.0087***
(0.0031)
1082
no
yes

Partic. Revolution
Friends Part. Rev.
Support Rev.
Grievances/ Satisfaction
Life Satisf.
Happiness
Satisf. Country
Satisf. Index
Knowledge
Knowledge (Subj.)
Knowledge (Obj.)
N
Parental Education Control
Family FE Control

Notes: Coefficients of OLS regression of different outcome variable (in rows) on years of education and other controls, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 Grievance variables are reverse coded and represent satisfaction (i.e. the opposite of grievances).

Table 2. Proportion of the effect of education on political participation mediated by knowledge and satisfaction

Knowledge Index
Proportion mediated
p value
Satisfaction Index
Proportion mediated
p value

Vote Tunisia

Vote Egypt

Participate in
the Revolution

Support the
Revolution

0.140
0.004

0.132
0.000

0.617
0.028

0.111
0.002

0.033
0.128

0.011
0.000

0.019
0.282

0.035
0.002

Notes: To estimate mediation, we use the procedure in Imai et al. (2011) as implemented in the R package Mediation.

Notes

i

In most countries, authoritarianism prevailed such as, for
example, in Egypt where the 2011/2012 parliamentary and presidential elections remained the only
episode of democratic elections.
ii

These data are available at
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2332, and
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2333
iii

These data are available at www.erfdataportal.com

iv

These two approaches can generate sample selection problems.
Because education can causally affect decisions to leave the parental household, parental and
sibling presence in the household are endogenous. Restricting our sample on the basis of variables
related to children remaining in their parental household might therefore render the education
coefficients difficult to interpret. To assess this issue, Table A10 in the Online Appendix shows the
basic results with the different samples implied by the different parental background controls, but
without actually adding these controls to the regressions. The coefficients are quite similar across
the different samples in most cases, implying that sample selection may not be so problematic in
this case.
v

In unreported regressions, we also find that education also
correlates positively with happiness in the 2009 Egypt survey. The 2009 Egypt survey was fielded
before the revolutions. The positive correlation between education and happiness in 2009 suggests
that results for the other years are not solely driven by the fact that grievances subsided after the
revolutions.
vi

We omit participation of friends in the revolution because, with
parental education controls, the coefficient for education in Table 3 is not statistically significant,
and all estimates of mediation proportion are also statistically insignificant.

